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This issue summarizes most of the United States
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions of the last
term.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
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Thermal Imaging
The defendant in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038
~· ... :~;-~',(2001 ), was suspected by an agent of the Department of
~;.cc~-4h~ Interior of growing marijuana in his home. Because
growing marijuana typically requires lamps that emit heat,
agents used an Amega Thermovision 210 thermal imager to
scan his residence. The scanner detects infrared radiation,
which is emitted by nearly all objects but remains invisible to
the naked eye. The scan took only a few minutes and
showed that the "roof over the garage and a side wall of
[Kyllo's] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of
the home and substantially warmer than neighboring
homes." Based on the scan results, Agent Elliot concluded
that Kyllo was growing marijuana plants using halide lights.
Based in part on the thermal imaging scan, a warrant to
search the residence was obtained. The search confirmed
that Kyllo was in fact growing more than 100 marijuana
plants in his home.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a thermal imaging scan of a residence constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Applying the test
from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court
had held in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), that a
"Fourth Amendment search does not occur- even when
the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
p,rivacy in the object of the challenged search,' and 'society
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."' ld.
at 2042-43. Recognizing the heightened expectation of privacy in a private home, the Court stated that "there is a
ready criterion, with roots deep in common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police tec.hnology to
~)

erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."
ld. at 2043.
The government argued that thermal imaging detects
only heat radiating from the external surfaces of the house
and, therefore, was not a search. The dissent supported
this contention, distinguishing between "off-the-wall" observations and "through-the-wall" surveillance. Rejecting this
argument, the Court stated that "[w]hile the technology used
in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or in development." ld. at 2044.
The government further contended that because the
agents drew only an inference regarding the activity in the
home it was not a search. In addition, the government asserted that thermal imaging was constitutional because it
did not "detect private activities occurring in private areas."
ld. at 2045. The Court rejected these arguments as well.
Quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),
the Court held that '"[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests
and rights of individual citizens.' Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use,
to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2046.

Warrantless Arrest for Minor Offenses
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (2001 ),
Mrs. Atwater was arrested for a seat belt violation following
a traffic stop. She sued the City of Lago Vista, claiming her
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The question
before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless arrests for a minor criminal offense, such
as a misdemeanor seat belt violation punishable only by a
fine.
Atwater claimed that police officers' authority to make
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later, and a search of the trailer uncovered 2.5 grams of
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
The Supreme Court held that the temporary seizure was
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "It
involves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances."' ld. at 950.
The Court, applying a balancing test, based its decision on
four circumstances. First, the police had probable cause to
believe the trailer contained contraband and had an opportunity to make an assessment of Tera McArthur's reliability.
Second, the police had good reason to believe that if the
defendant were permitted to enter the residence unaccompanied he would destroy the evidence. Third, the police
chose to prevent McArthur from entering his residence until
a warrant arrived instead of searching the trailer or arresting
McArthur without a warrant. "They left his home and his belongings intact." ld. at 950. '"The chief evil against which
the ... Fourth Amendment is directed' is warrantless entry
and search of home." ld. at 950 (quoting United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)). Fourth,
the restraint was imposed for a limited amount of time.
McArthur was restrained for only two hours. "As far as the
record reveals, this time period was nci longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain
the warrant." 121 S.Ct. at 951.
The Court stated: "[W]e have found no case in which this
Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the
loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time." ld. at 951-52.

warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at
common law. She argued specifically that "'founding-era
common-law rules' forbade peace officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of 'breach of the
peace,' a category she claims was then understood narrowly as covering only those nonfelony offenses 'involving or
tending toward violence."' ld. at 1543.
The Supreme Court disagreed. After examining the common usage of the term "breach of the peace," as well as the
available case law, the Court discovered "divergent conclusions with respect to officers' warrantless misdemeanor arrest power." ld. at 1544. Apparently the term "breach of the
peace" meant different things depending on the context.
"Having reviewed the relevant English decisions, as well as
English and colonial American legal treatises, legal dictionaries, and procedure manuals, we simply are not convinced that Atwater's is the correct, or even necessarily the
better, reading of the common-law history." ld. at 1546. "We
simply cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as ·
originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the peace." ld. at 1550.
Alternatively, Atwater asked the Court to "mint a new rule
of constitutional law on the understanding that when historical practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded
on the Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current
balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional
standards of reasonableness." ld. at 1553.
The Court recognized that Atwater "might well prevail" if a
rule was derived to "exclusively address the uncontested
facts of this case." Id. at 1553. However, the Court replied
to Atwater's argument by stating, "we have traditionally recognized that a responsible J=ourth Amendment balance is
not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-bycase determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion
for constitutional review." ld. at 1553.
The Supreme Court concluded that Atwater's arrest was
constitutional. Probable cause was not disputed, and, although the arrest may have caused Atwater embarrassment
or humiliation, it was not made in an extraordinary manner.

Pretextual Searches
In Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. 1876 (2001 ), Sullivan
was stopped by police officers for speeding and having improperly tinted windows. After viewing Sullivan's driver's license, the police realized that they were aware of intelligence on Sullivan regarding narcotics. Sullivan was arrested for speeding, driving without registration and insurance
documentation, carrying a weapon (a rusty roofing hatchet),
and improper window tinting. During an inventory search of
Sullivan's car following his arrest, police officers found drugs
(methamphetamine) and drug paraphernalia. Sullivan
moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that his arrest
was merely a "pretext and sham to search" him. The trial
court granted Sullivan's motion to suppress, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on its previous decision
in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 'The
Arkansas Supreme Court declined to follow Whren on the
ground that 'much of it is dicta.' The court reiterated the trial
judge's conclusion that 'the arrest was pretextual and made
for the purpose of searching Sullivan's vehicle for evidence
of a crime,' and observed that 'we do not believe that Whren
disallows' suppression on such a basis. Finally, the court
asserted that, even if it were to conclude that Whren precludes inquiry into an arresting officer's subjective motivation, 'there is nothing that prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing
more rights."' ld. at 1878 (citations omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Arkansas
Supreme Court's affirmation of the trial court's suppression
of the drug-related evidence was improper because the decision was "flatly contrary" to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Whren. The Court, quoting from its decision in

Execution of Search Warrants
In Illinois v. McArthur, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001 ), the Supreme
Court concluded that law enforcement officials acted reasonably when they refused to allow a man suspected of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana to
enter his residence unaccompanied until a search warrant
was obtained.
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur went to the trailer she
shared with her husband to obtain her personal effects.
Mrs. McArthur was accompanied by police officers for the
purpose of keeping the peace. Upon leaving the trailer with
her belongings, Mrs. McArthur advised the police to search
the trailer because she had seen her husband slide "some
dope underneath the couch." Charles McArthur refused to
allow the police to search his trailer. At that time a police officer, accompanied by Tera McArthur, left the scene to obtain a search warrant. When Charles McArthur, now positioned on the front porch, attempted to enter his trailer, the
remaining officer detained him, explaining that McArthur
would not be permitted to enter his residence unaccompanied by a police officer until a search warrant was obtained.
A search warrant was obtained approximately two hours
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only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion." ld. at 457.
The Court did allow for exceptions in extraordinary situations when the primary purpose of a vehicle checkpoint is
general crime control such as roadblocks designed to
"thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous
criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route."
While allowing for exceptions, the Court declined to approve
vehicle checkpoint programs "whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from general crime control." ld. at
455.

Whren, noted its '"unwillingness to entertain Fourth
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of
individual officers,' and held unanimously that 'subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis."' ld. at 1877.
Next, the Court addressed the Arkansas Supreme
Court's holding that it may interpret the U.S. Constitution to
provide greater protection than the United States Supreme
Court's federal constitutional precedents. The state court
had cited Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court held ''that while 'a State is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions
on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards,' it 'may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them."' Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. at 1878 (quoting Hass, 420
U.S. at 719).

Drug Testing
Motivated by an apparent increase in cocaine use by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of
South Carolina [MUSC] instituted a policy to identify pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse and began conducting urine tests of hospital obstetric patients pursuant to that
policy. Ten obstetric patients who were arrested after testing positive for cocaine sued the City of Charleston, law enforcement officials who helped develop and enforce the policy, and representatives of MUSC alleging, inter alia, violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed without addressing the consent
issue. The Court of Appeals found the searches to be reasonable as a matter of law under the "special needs" doctrine as set forth in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602
(1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1995).
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S.Ct. 1281
(2001 ), the Supreme Court held that: (1) the urine tests
conducted by the MUSC were "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) absent patients' consent, thetesting.and subsequent reporting of positive test
results to police constituted unreasonable searches. The
Court found that "because the hospital seeks to justify its
authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the results over
to law enforcement agents without the knowledge or consent of the patients, this case differs from the four previous
cases in which we have considered whether comparable
drug tests "fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." ld. at 1288.
In each of the previous drug-testing cases the Court had
used a balancing test where it "weighed the intrusion on the
individual's interest in privacy against the 'special needs'
that supported the program." ld. at 1288. However, in these
cases the purpose of the drug test and the potential use of
the test results were understood by the parties. In addition,
there were protections against the dissemination of the test
results to third parties. This was not true in this case.
The Court found the critical difference to "lie in the nature
of the 'special need' asserted as justification for the warrantless searches." In the previous drug-testing cases the "special need" was "divorced from the State's general interest in
law enforcement." ld. at 1289. Jjer~. a rE)yl_E?_'JV ofJ!l_E) policy
plainly revealed that the purpose actually served by the
MUSC searches was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. The policy incorporated the police's
operational guidelines, detailing chain of custody procedures, possible criminal charges, and the logistics of police
notification and arrests. The policy did not, however, discuss different courses of medical treatment for either the

Drug Roadblocks
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000),
the city of Indianapolis set up vehicle checkpoints in an effort to discover and interdict illegal drugs. The police
stopped a predetermined number of vehicles at each checkpoint. An officer approached the vehicle, advised the driver
that they were being stopped at a drug checkpoint, and
asked the driver for a license and vehicle registration. The
officer looked for "signs of impairment" and condw;:ted an
"open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside." Id.
at 450-51. The average time of each vehicle stop was 2-3
minutes, not including vehicles subject to further processing.
Respondents filed a class action suit against the city,
claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme
Court agreed.
Previous Supreme Court decisions had upheld brief, suspicionless vehiGie searches at -permanent immigration
checkpoints to intercept illegal aliens and at highway sobriety checkpoints to identify and detain drunk drivers. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Michigan
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The primary purposes of these checkpoint programs were "to
serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing
the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety."
However, the Court had never indicated "approval of a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 121 S.Ct. at 452.
The Court rejected the contention that the Indianapolis
program had the same ultimate purpose as the previously
upheld checkpoint programs: to arrest those suspected of
committing a crime. The Court reasoned that "if we were to
rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be
little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose." ld. at 454.
In addition, the city argued that the secondary purpose of
the checkpoints -to verify license and registration information and_keep_impaired_motorists_oJLtbero_ad_:::- satisfied
Fourth Amendment concerns. Again, the Court rejected the
argument, finding that under such a policy "law enforcement
authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or
sobriety check." The Court went on to hold: "When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control
purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can
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counsel attaches only to charged offenses, we have
recognized in other contexts that the definition of an
"offense" is not necessarily limited to the four corners
of a charging instrument. In Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 ... we explained that "where the
(
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." ... We have since applied
the B/ockburger test to delineate the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which prevents multiple or successive prosecutions for the
"same offence." We see no constitutional difference
between the meaning of the term "offense" in the contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel.
Accordingly, we hold that when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses
that, even if.not formally charged, would be considered
the same offense under the 8/ockburger test. ld. at
. 1343.
The Court concluded that Cobb's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was not violated when he was interrogated about
the disappearance of Mrs. Owing and her daughter.
Therefore, the confession was admissible.

mother who has tested positive for cocaine or her infant.
This appeared inconsistent with the stated purpose of the
policy: to protect the health of both mother and child.
The Supreme Court also stated that "[w]hile the ultimate
goal of the program may well have been to get the women
in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs,
the immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach
that goal." ld. at 1291. The Court found the "primary purpose" of the policy to be to force women into drug treatment
through the use of threat of arrest and prosecution. Given
the primary purpose of the policy and the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials in its development and implementation, the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches.
CONFESSIONS: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001), Lindsey Owings
found his home burglarized with his wife and infant daughter
missing. Raymond Levi Cobb admitted to burglarizing the
home, which was located across the street from his residence. Cobb was subsequently indicted for burglary and
appointed counsel. While admitting to the burglary, Cobb
denied knowledge of the whereabouts of Mrs. Owings and
her daughter.
Cobb's father, whom Cobb was living with while free on
bond, contacted police and indicated that Cobb confessed
to killing Mrs. Owings and her daughter. Officers arrested
Cobb and obtained his waiver of Fifth Amendment rights
under Miranda. Cobb then confessed to police the murder
of Mrs. Owings and her daughter and led police to the area
where he buried their bodies. Cobb's confession was used
to obtain his conviction of capital murder.
Cobb appealed the conviction to the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, claiming his confession should have been
suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. He contended his right to
counsel attached when he was appointed counsel for the
burglary charge and, therefore, police were required to obtain permission to interrogate Cobb from his appointed
counsel. The state court agreed, but the U.S. Supreme
Court decided to review the case to determine whether the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to crimes that
are "factually related" to those that have actually been
charged.
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), the Court
held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." ld. at 175. Thus, a defendant's statements regarding
offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel on other charged offenses.
Some state and federal courts had read an exception into
McNeil's offense-specific definition for crimes that are factually related to a charged offense. The Court rejected this interpretation of McNeil, reiterating its holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. The Court
further stated:
Although it is clear that the Sixth Amendment right to

FIFTH AMENDMENT
In Ohio v. Matthew Reiner, 121 S.Ct. 1252 (2001), the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed an Ohio Supreme Court decision, holding that a witness who claims innocence may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Matthew Reiner was convicted of the involun- ('
tary manslaughter of his two-month old son, Alex. Alex died .
from "shaken baby syndrome." Reiner contended that the
family's baby-sitter, Susan Batt, was responsible for the infant's death. Batt had cared for Reiner's children for about
two weeks before the infant died and was alone with Alex
during the potential time frame Alex sustained the fatal trauma.
Batt informed the trial court that she intended to assert
her Fifth Amendment privilege when testifying at trial. The
court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution
at the State's request. Batt testified that she had refused to
testify without immunity from prosecution "although she had
· done nothing wrong." ld. at 1253. Reiner was subsequently
convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of his infant son.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction on
the ground that Batt had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege
and that the trial court's grant of immunity was therefore unlawful. The state court held Batt did not have a valid Fifth
Amendment privilege because her testimony at trial did not
incriminate her.
·
The U.S. Supreme Court found that Batt did have a valid
Fifth Amendment privilege. The Court stated "that one of
the Fifth Amendment's 'basic functions ... is to protect innocent men ... 'who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances."' ld.at 1254 (quoting Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391). Batt had been alone with the
infant for extended periods of time in the weeks preceding
(.
the infant's death. In addition, she was alone with the infant
during the time period in which the fatal trauma may have
occurred. The Court concluded that "Batt had 'reasonable
cause' to apprehend danger from her answers if questioned
at respondent's trial" and, therefore, reasonably feared that
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her answers to direct questions may have incriminated her.
ld. at1255.

MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE: MARIJUANA
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, 121 S.Ct. 1711 (2001 ), the Supreme Court refused to recognize medical necessity as a legally cognizable defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative distributed
marijuana for medical purposes under California's 1996
Compassionate Use Act.
The United States sued the Cooperative to enjoin it from
distributing and manufacturing marijuana by arguing that, although it may not have violated California law, it had violated federal law. Because an injunction issued by the District
Court was openly violated, the Cooperative was subsequently found in contempt.
The Controlled Substances Act prohibits "any person
knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841
(a)(1 ). The Act provides an exception in cases of government-approved research projects. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress would have provided for a medical
necessity exception if it had intended to exempt such conduct. The Court failed to accept the Cooperative's argument that the Act contains implied exceptions, including
medical necessity.
Faced with the question whether federal courts ever have
authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by
statute, the Court stated "[w]hether as a policy matter, an
exemption should be created is a question for legislative
judgment, not judicial inference." Id. at 1717. The Court
concluded, "we need only recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the
Controlled Substances Act." ld. at 171.8.

EX POST FACTO: OVERTURNING JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT
In Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001 ), the accused stabbed his victim, who remained comatosed until his
death 15 months later. Rogers was convicted of seconddegree murder and subsequently appealed. He argued his
conviction was precluded by the common law "year and a
day" rule, which provided that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the victim dies within a year and a day of the
defendant's act. The Tennessee Supreme Court abolished
the rule, citing a lack of support in policy as the reason. It
concluded, relying on Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), that Rogers' due process rights were not violated.
Rogers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Rogers argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited
the application of the decision abolishing the common law
"year and a day" rule, therefore violating his due process
rights. The Court concluded:
In the context of common law doctrines (such as the
year and a day rule), there often arises a need to clarify or even to reevaluate prior opinions as new circumstances and fact patterns present themselves. Such
judicial acts, whether they be characterized as "making" or "finding" the law, are a necessary part of the judicial business in States in which the criminal law retains some of its common law elements. Strict application of ex post facto principles in that context would
unduly impair the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law system. The common law, in short, presupposes a measure of evolution that is incompatible with
stringent application of ex post facto principles. It was
on account of concerns such as these that Bouie restricted due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes
to those that are "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to
the conduct in issue." Rogers, 121 S.Ct. at 1700 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354).
Applying this analysis to the facts, the Court concluded
that the abolition of the "year and a day" rule was not unexpected and indefensible. The rule has been "abolished in
the vast majority of jurisdictions recently to have addressed
the issue." ld. at 1701.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Tennessee criminal
homicide statute does not mention the "year and a day"
rule. The statute defines criminal homicide simply as "the
unlawful killing of another person which may be first degree
murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter,
criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide." Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-201 (1997). "[T]he rule had never once
served as a ground of decision in any prosecution for murder in the State. Indeed, in all the reported Tennessee
cases, the rule has been mentioned only three·times, and
each time in dicta." ld. at 1701.
Finally, the Court concluded that "[t]here is, in short, nothing to indicate that the Tennessee court's abolition of the
rule in petitioner's case represented an exercise of the sort
of unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the Due
Process Clause aims to protect." ld. at 1703.

DEATH PENALTY
Mitigating Circumstances
The Supreme Court overturned a death sentence in
Penry v. Johnson, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (2001 ). Although Penry
was mentally retarded, the Court did not address the issue
of whether a mentally retarded person should be executed,
but rather overturned Penry's death sentence because the
jury instructions did not allow jurors to sufficiently take his
retardation into account. The Court stated it would revisit
the issue of whether the execution of a mentally retarded
person is constitutionally permissible in· its next term.
In Penry I, the Supreme Court had held that, based on
the prosecutor's argument and the jury instructions, "a reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to
be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence."
ld. at 1915-16. The Court stated that a juror must be able to
consider mitigating evidence when imposing sentence "so
that 'the sentence imposed ... reflects a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime."' ld. at 1916.
Penry was retried and again found guilty of capital murder. In Penry II the jury was instructed to answer three special issues to determine the sentence in addition to a supplemental instruction. However, the verdict form only contained the three special issues and not the supplemental instruction. These were the same three issues as in Penry I.
The jury unanimously answered "yes" to each of the special
issues, and the trial court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with state law.
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On review, the Supreme Court considered whether the
jury instructions at Penry's resentencing complied with
Penry I and whether the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled
interview with Penry ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
Addressing the issue of the psychiatric report, the Court
distinguished the instant case and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981 ). The Court stated that its holding in Estelle was
"limited to the 'distinct circumstances' presented there" and
"indicated that the Fifth Amendment analysis might be different where a defendant 'intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase."' ld. at 1919. Because Penry's
facts were different from Estelle's, the Court found the
Texas court's decision denying Penry's Fifth Amendment
claim reasonable.
Penry also claimed the jury instructions given at the second sentencing hearing did not comply with the Supreme
Court's holding in Penry I. "[T]he key under Penry I is that
the jury be able to 'consider and give effect to [a defendant's
mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence' .... For it is only
when the jury is given a 'vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned
moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing
decision,' that we can be sure that the jury 'has treated the
defendant as a 'uniquely individual human being' and has
made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate
sentence."' Penry, 121 S.Ct. at 1920 (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
The Court concluded that the three special issues conflicted with the supplemental instruction. "[l]t would have
been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to follow both sets of instructions." ld. at 1922. Essentially, in
order to avoid imposing a death sentence, the jury would
have had to answer falsely to a special issue. The
Supreme Court found the Texas court's determination that
the jury instructions given in Penry II complied with Penry I
unreasonable.

is life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the
defendant to inform the jury he is parole ineligible."' ld. at
1270. It held "Simmons generally inapplicable to South
Carolina's 'new sentencing scheme"' without considering if
Shafer's future dangerousness was placed at issue. ld. at

1270.
Under the South Carolina sentencing scheme, however,
the jury is the sole sentencer only upon an initial finding of a
statutory aggravator. If aggravating circumstances are
found, only two sentencing options are available to the jury,
death and life without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court
wrote:_''WetberE!fore hold that whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under
South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that
the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole."
SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES
Young, respondent in this case, was a convicted rapist
(convicted of six rapes in three decades) confined in
Washington state since 1990 under that state's sexually violent predator statute. Seling v. Young, 121 S.Ct. 727 (2001 ).
The statute provides for civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," persons who suffer from a mental abnormality ot personality disorder that makes them likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence. Wash. Rev. Code §
71.09.010 et seq. (1992).
Young filed a habeas corpus petition appealing his commitment, arguing that the Act violated the Double Jeopardy,
Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses.
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that "the Act ...
is concerned with treating committed persons for a current
mental abnormality, and protecting society from the sexually
violent acts associated with that abnormality, rather than
beinQ concerned with criminal culpability."
The U.S. Supreme Court began by assuming the Act was
civil in nature. In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93
(1 997), the Court "expressly disapproved of evaluating the
civil nature of an Act by reference to the effect that Act has
on a single individual. Instead, courts must evaluate the
question by reference to a variety of factors 'considered in
relation to the statute on its face'; the clearest proof is required to override legislative intent and conclude that an Act
denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect." Id. at 734.
"With this in mind, [the Court] turn[ed] to the Court of
Appeals' determination that respondent could raise an 'asapplied' challenge to the Act on double jeopardy and ex ·
post facto grounds and seek release from confinement." ld.
at 734.
The Court held that "respondent cannot obtain release
through an 'as-applied' challenge to the Washington Act on
double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds." It agreed "with
petitioner that an 'as-applied' analysis would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve
whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby
prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses." ld. at

Jury Instructions
The accused in Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263
(2001 ), was convicted of murder, attempted armed robbery,
and criminal conspiracy. Shafer was subsequently sentenced to death. At the sentencing hearing, against defense
argument, "[t]he trial judge decided 'not ... to charge the jury
about parole ineligibility,' ... and informed counsel that he
would instruct [the jury as follows]: 'Your consideration is
restricted to what sentence to recommend. I will, as trial
judge, impose the sentence you recommend. Section 16-320 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides that for the
purpose of this section life imprisonment means until the
death of the offender. Parole eligibility is not for your consideration."' Shafer, 121 S.Ct. at 1269. Shafer appealed
the death sentence, arguing that jurors should have been
instructed that he was ineligible for parole.
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154 (1994). It "acknowledged that 'when the State
places the defendant's-future dangerousness at issue and
the only available alternative sentence to the death penalty
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